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NUMBER 1

The Wyoming Supreme Court's April 1982 term was a very
important one for Wyoming administrative law. In this article the
author examines several administrative law decisions from that term.
The article offers practical and theoretical help to the practitioner who
would understand the signflcance of these decisions.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
WYOMING STYLE
Jackson B. Battle*
The April, 1982, term was an unusually active one for
the Wyoming Supreme Court in administrative law. In
fact, the file which I started four years ago for significant
new Wyoming administrative law decisions nearly doubled
in size between the first of May and the end of September,
1982. I can only assume that this is some indication of the
increasing amount of administrative practice in the state.
Bureaucracy has finally sunk its roots in Wyoming, lawyers are learning how to live with it, and the supreme court
is increasingly called upon to resolve conflicts in its implementation. If the past term's decisions are any indication,
we can expect a few growing pains as this field of law
matures in our state.
I have collected six' significant administrative law
decisions from this last term. Two are relatively uncomCopyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. The research for this
article was partially supported by the Amax Foundation through a faculty
summer research grant, for which the author is grateful.
1. The court's decision in Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651
P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982), could be counted as a seventh, but I have notprimarily because it treats a very narrow, albeit very important, subject:
the proper procedures for exercise of the Secretary of State's authority
rgarding a voter initiative and the proper scope of judicial review thereof.
The in-depth analysis that this case deserves will be left to another author
or, at least, another day.
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plicated, their results predictable, their holdings straightforward, and their implications on practice clear.' The
remainder, however, are not so easily digested; and it is
these four with which this article is concerned..
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION V. STATE

Probably the most significant decision of the April
term is one that moved me to write "Incredible" across the
top of my advance sheet when I first read it, because it
didn't jibe with the "black letter" law of judicial review
as I had come to view (and teach) it. But, as with a distressingly large number of legal issues which I confront,
my first impression was not the one remaining after more
2. In Wyoming State Dep't of Educ. v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982), the
court was given the opportunity to approve of an agency's utilization of
an independent hearing officer to preside at a contested case before it
for decision. First, the court held that a law professor who contracted
with the State Board of Education was an "employee" entitled to preside
under section 9-4-112(a) of the APA. Id. at 687-88. It then went on to
approve, over a due process challenge, the procedure whereby the board
did not actually preside, but based its decision on the full record made
before the hearing officer, assisted by his recommended decision-thereby
recognizing in Wyoming the long-standing "general rule" established by
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). Id. at 688. The only debatable part of the decision was the part objected to by Justice Rooney in his
special concurrence: the majority's holding that the State Board of Education (as opposed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction) had
statutory authority to decide certification disputes. Id. at 691-92 (Rooney,
J., specially concurring). The supreme court has had problems before with
state agencies assuming adjudicative authority when they have none. See
McNeill v. Park County School Dist. No. 1, 635 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1981).
Because the court now has pending before it another case again raising
this issue, Brasel & Sims Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, No. 5678
(Wyo. argued 1982), discussion should await this further look at the
problem.
State v. Fremont Energy Corp. 651 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1982) was an easy
case which gave the supreme court the opportunity to expound on general
principles of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" and "primary jurisdiction"-both of which it covered nicely-while rejecting an attempt to invoke
either of these doctrines. The district court had declined to exercise its
jurisdiction to hear a civil action brought by the State against Fremont
Energy Corporation for monetary penalties and injunctive relief based on
alleged violations of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act and regulations promulgated thereunder. Its basis for dismissing the action was that
Fremont Energy was first entitled to a hearing before the Environmental
Quality Council. The supreme court reversed, holding that it was improper
to apply either the exhaustion doctrine or primary jurisdiction in the face
of an express statutory provision making it clear that the Department of
Environmental Quality could choose the enforcement method which it
deemed best. "Nothing in this section [providing, in part, for a hearing
before the Council] shall be interpreted to in any way limit or contravene
any other remedy available under this act, nor shall this section be interpreted as a condition precedent to any other enforcement action under this
act." WYO. STAT. § 35-11-701(d) (1977 & SUpp. 1981). Although this
unanimous decision could have been short and sweet, it is long and wellreasoned and should provide ample guidance for future, more applicable,
invocations of these two doctrines.
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serious thought and research on the subject. So now I'm in
the happy position of being able to agree with the supreme
court -

if it means what I think it does -

as to both law

and policy.
In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. State'
(RMOGA), a number of oil and gas producers in the state
sought to challenge rules promulgated by the Environmental
Quality Council regulating, among other things, certain
subsurface discharges of oil-field wastes into groundwater.
Because some seventy-one days had elapsed, however, after
the final adoption of the rules, they were unable to petition for review within the thirty-day period provided both
by Rule 12.04 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure
and by section 35-11-1001(a) of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act. Instead, they filed an original action
in district court for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the Council had exceeded its statutory authority -

its "jurisdiction" -

in promulgating rules governing

such disposal of oil-field wastes and had assumed powers
exclusively granted to the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. The district court dismissed the complaint,
holding that the action was barred by sovereign immunity,
and also finding that the declaratory judgment action was
"in the nature of a petition for review" and, as such, was
barred by the thirty-day limitations period. The supreme
court disagreed on both scores and reversed.
On the sovereign immunity issue, the court employed
some fairly clumsy sleight of hand4 to overrule, in effect,
the most objectionable part of its 1975 holding in Retail
Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University of Wyoming:'
that actions for declaratory relief were barred along with
actions for injunctive relief and damages against state
3. 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1982).
4. The court's reasoning was that Retail Clerks was distinguishable in that
there the plaintiffs had asked for an injunction and damages as well as a
declaratory judgment (although the court had expressly ruled against
the prayer for declaratory relief) and that, in any event, the limited
waivers of immunity for tort and contract claims in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act "fortified" the waiver of immunity in declaratory
judgment actions. 645 P.2d at 1166.
5. 531 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1975).
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agencies.' Henceforth, actions against the state for declaratory judgment7 would no longer be barred by the doctrine
when the only issue was one of construction or validity of a
statute or constitutional provision.'
Lifting the sovereign immunity barrier, however, did
not end the matter. The "general rule"' in administrative
law is that forms of review such as actions for declaratory
and injunctive relief are not available when adequate specific
statutory procedures are provided for judicial review of a
particular sort of agency action. 0 Moreover, even if such
"nonstatutory" review remains available, it would seem
reasonable to limit its availability to the thirty-day period
provided in the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act" and
in the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure governing
petitions for review of administrative action."2
Without even a nod to the general rule of the exclusiveness of statutory review or a reply to Chief Justice Rose's
dissent arguing for application of the thirty-day deadline, 3
6. Id. at 886-87. Also barred were actions against their employees, when the
relief sought would result in imposing contractual liabilities on the state.
Id. at 887.
7. It would seem that the same reasoning would support actions for injunctive relief, mandamus, and prohibition (where otherwise appropriate
remedies) against state agencies when no danger of monetary liability
exists.
8. See the emphasis on this limitation in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n
v. State, 645 P.2d at 1165-66 (Wyo. 1982). This suggests that declaratory
judgment actions can be used to review administrative action only as to
d"pure questions of law" and cannot be used as a substitute for a petition
for review or to otherwise challenge agency findings or procedural defects.
See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
9. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 145, at 432-35 (1976) [hereinafter cited as B. SCHWARTZ]; infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
10. Section 35-11-1001(a) of the Wyoming Statutes expresses a specific procedure for judicial review of agency action under the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act:
Any aggrieved party under this act, any person who filed a
complaint on which a hearing was denied, and any person who has
been denied a variance or permit under this act, may obtain judicial
review by filing a petition for review within thirty (30) days after
entry of the order or other final action complained of pursuant to
the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
[§§ 9-4-101 to 9-4-115].
WYo. STAT. § 35-11-1001(a) (1977).
11. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1001(a) (1977).
12. Wyo. R. App. P. 12.04.
13. Although Chief Justice Rose agreed with the majority that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was inapplicable, he would have held that the late filing
of RMOGA's declaratory judgment action required dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. He did not treat a petition for review pursuant to section 3511-1001 or Rule 12 as the exclusive form for review; but he did view their
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the majority immediately turned to the particular scheme
expressed by Wyoming rules and statutes. And here the
message was clear. Rule 12.12 of the Wyoming Rules of
Appellate Procedure," section 1-37-102 of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act,15 and Rule 57 of the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure"0 all state, in one form or another,
that the existence of another adequate remedy, such as petition for review, does not preclude declaratory judgment
relief. These express directions were enough for the supreme

court.17 Declaratory relief would be available notwithstanding any specific statutory review procedure or time limitations thereon - subject again, however, to the court's
limitation of the relief to challenges concerning "the validity
and constitutionality of agency regulations" or "the con-

14.

15.

16.

17.

thirty-day limitations periods as jurisdictional prerequisites to declaratory
relief. See 645 P.2d at 1169-74 (Rose, C.J., dissenting). His reasonine was
as follows: (1) the Declaratory Judgments Act is not itself jurisdictional,
but only nrovides an additional remedy when jurisdiction otherwise exists;
(2) both Rule 12.04 avd section M6-11-1001 contain thirty-day filing nerinds;
(.) such statutory filing periods are Jurisdictional: therefore, (4) Rule
12.12 mnuqt be construed to nermit actions for declaratnrv relief, and other
such "independent action." to be brought only as substitutes for a petition
for review within the thirtv-dav filinT neriod. Td. (As discussed infra. in
notes 4-15 and aeeornp ,'ine tept. the lean in this svllocrismis the assumntion that sectinn 35-11-1001 and Rule 12 are the only jurisdictional grounds
for the delaratory iud rnent action.)
The Chief Ju~*ce included a iusticiabilitv or "Aneness" ohiection and
joined in Tustee Thomas's dissent-cr view that RMOGA failed to exhaust
its administrative remedy of petitioninot the Conneil for amendment or
repePi of the rule pursuant to seetion Q-4-106 of the Wvoynnin Administrative Procedure Act. See 645 P.2d at 1174-76 IThomas. J.. dissentinp,).
The relief, review, or redress availahle in suits for injunction
azainst agency action or enforcement thereof, in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory judeinent of richts,
status. or legal relations based on administrative action or inaction,
in actions for mandamus to compel administrotive action, and in
applications for writs of certiorari and prohMtion to review or
prevent administrative action shall be available bV independent
action notwithstanding any petition for review filed.
Wyo. R. App. P. 12.12.
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed. No proceeding is onen to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for.
WYO. STAT. § 1-37-102 (1977).
The procedure for obtainine a declaratory jude-ment pursuant
to sections 3-5801 to 3-5816 inclusive of W.C.S. 1945 [6§ 1-37-101
to 1-37-115], shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in
the manner provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another
adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory
relief in cases where it is appropriate.
Wyo. R. Crv. P. 57.
Rocky Mountain Oli and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d at 1167-69 (Wyo.
1982).
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stitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the
administrative action is, or is to be, based."" s
As so limited, this is desirable law. Insulating administrative rules from attack after a brief and exclusive period
for judicial review does have the virtue of creating stability
and predictability in regulation. But its price is possible
governance by a rule which the agency had no authority to
make. This cost may be acceptable in the federal system, or
even in an especially large state system, where the alternative
is subjecting rules to diverse challenges, and diverse holdings as to their legality, in dozens of different trial courts,
which are reviewed by intermediate appellate courts without
obligation to follow one another, and without the possibility
of resolution of but a few such conflicts each year by the
highest court. Where such serious threats to the uniformity
and predictability of regulation are at stake, it is understandable to want a rule which provides that any specific
statutory review procedure is exclusive. In Wyoming, however, with fewer rules, fewer challenges, fewer trial courts,
no intermediate appellate courts, and a supreme court able
to expeditiously resolve any conflicting lower court decisions
and correct any bad law made in the trial courts, the threats
to uniformity are simply not great enough to pay the price
of ultravires regulation.
Also, where notice of proposed rulemaking and final
promulgation of rules is published in something akin to the
Federal Register,"9 a restricted review period is more tolerable. Potentially concerned persons then at least have
available the means of spotting an adverse rule before it is
too late to challenge it. In Wyoming, however, it is quite
possible that final rules could pass without notice by affected
interests until applied to them."°
18. Id. at 1168.
19. In the federal system, notice of proposed rulemaking is required by 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (1976) to be published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a) (1) (D) (1976), likewise, requires that final rules be published there.
The Federal Register is published daily, Monday through Friday; and,
although certainly not on everyone's breakfast table, it is at least scanned
routinely by trade, business, professional, and other organization which
alert their members to proposed and final rules affecting their interests.
20. Section 9-4-103 (a) (i) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act does
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Had this decision gone the other way, the spectre would
arise of sanctions being imposed on, or licenses denied to,
parties who had received no real opportunity to contest the
rules being applied as lacking statutory authority, or even
constitutionality. Courts generally will allow the statutory
authority -

i.e., the "jurisdiction" -

of agency rules to be

challenged in civil and criminal enforcement actions, in
licensing proceedings and reviews thereof, and in other
contexts in which the rules are applied, so long as no express
statutory provisions exist making direct review the exclusive
means of challenge. 2 In Wyoming, however, the availability
of such collateral attack is not assured - despite Chief
Justice Rose's seeming assumption that it is." This is beprovide for mailing of advanced notice of proposed rulemaking "to all persons making timely requests of the agency" for such notice of its rulemaking proceedings, and this is effective at least for organized, well-represented
interests. But there is no comparable requirement for distribution of rules
to affected persons and interests upon promulgation. The only requirement
is that of section 9-4-104(a) for filing adopted rules with the Secretary
of State (the County Clerk for local rules), Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-104(a) (1977
& Supp. 1982), who then compiles them and makes them available for public
inspection, Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-4-104(a) and 105 (a) (Supp. 1982), [revising
the compilation "at least once every two (2) years," Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-105
(a) (Supp. 1982)]. This system is still much like those in most states,
which have been criticized for their inaccessibility:
The situation in them, where a lawyer may still have to dig out
the relevant regulations himself at the state capital, is a modern
version of Caligula's method of writing his laws in very small
letters and hanging them up on high pillars, "the more effectively
to ensnare the people."
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at § 63, at 179.
21. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at §§ 193-94; DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 23.07 (1958 & Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
As an example of a civil action in which the defendant was allowed to
challenge the regulation being applied, see United States v. McCrillis, 200
F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952). For the opposite result in a civil penalty action
in light of an express statutory preclusion of review except by certain procedures, see United States v. Southern Ry. Co., 380 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1967).
For the same difference in results in criminal enforcement actions,
depending on whether or not the statutory review route is expressly made
exclusive, compare McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), with
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Subsequent qualifications on
both these cases, however, should be noted. In McGee v. United States, 402
U.S. 479 (1971), McKart was limited to challenges not involving the application of agency expertise to the resolution of underlying issues of fact.
In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978), Yakus was
not applied to insulate an EPA-promulgated emission standard from attack
in a criminal enforcement action, as seemingly required by statute, when
the defense was that the regulation the defendant was charged with criminally violating as not an "emission standard" at all.
The essence of the general rule is expressed in the last sentence of
section 703 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act: "Except to the
extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is
provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil and
criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement." 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
22. "I am simply saying that, in these circumstances, under § 9-4-114, review
cannot now become available until the challenged regulation is applied to

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 6

230

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol.

XVIII

cause quite recently the Wyoming Supreme Court may have
held that it is not.
In Wyoming Board of Equalization v. State,2 3 the court
held that, in a hearing before the board on appeal of a tax
assessment, the taxpayer could not challenge the validity of
the particular valuation rule there being applied, but could
only challenge the application of the rule to him. Arguably,
the holding can be limited to a construction of the particular
statutory provision for a hearing which was there in issue.
Arguably, it can be read to hold only that mandamus cannot
compel the board to hear a collateral attack on its ruie so
long as an "adequate remedy at law" - there an unexpired
period for petitioning for direct judicial review - remains
available. And, arguably, it can be read merely to bar a
collateral attack in the administrative agency but to permit
such a challenge to be raised in the court reviewing the
agency's application of the rule. This last limiting consttuction, however, seems to fly in the face of the first sentence
in Rule 12.09 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure,2 '
the consistent holdings of Wyoming cases,25 and the general:
principle of administrative law that a reviewing court may
not consider issues not raised before the agency.2"
So long as the possibility remains that Wyoming Board.
of Equalization v. State will be construed to bar challenge
to a rule in proceedings in which it is applied, every presumption should be against finding that a particular st. 7tutory direct review procedure and limitations period is
exclusive.2" Certainly the clearest expression of legislative
23.
24.
25.
26.

the appellants, at which time the appellants may utilize whatever defenses
are available under the law." 645 P.2d at 1174 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
637 P.2d 248, 252 (Wyo. 1981).
"The review.. . shall be confined to the record as supplemented ... and to
the issues raised before the agency." WYo. R. APP. P. 12.09 (emphasis
added).
See In the Matter of N. Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 1980);
Wyoming Bancorp. v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974).
See DAVIS, supra note 21, at § 20.06 (1958 & Supp. 1970, 1976). Here
Davis's conclusion, based on the cases which he discusses, is that the
general rule that a reviewing court may not consider issues not raised

before the agency is sometimes not applied to a claim that the agency
patently acted beyond its jurisdiction.
27. However, the legislature may, of course, expressly provide that a particular
review procedure and limitations period is exclusive. The RMOGA decision

contains no indication to the contrary, and the power given to the supreme
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intent should be required before a statutory scheme is so
interpreted.
But the statutory scheme in Wyoming indicates quite
the contrary intent. Looking first at the specific authorization for judicial review involved in RMOGA, section 35-111001 of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act,2" one
finds no language suggesting that its procedure or thirtyday time limit is exclusive.29 Turning to the Wyoming APA
itself, the only section in the APA pertaining to judicial
review, section 9-4-114, merely entitles aggrieved and affected persons to "judicial review.""0 It does not speak in
terms of "petition for review," or any particular form of
review, or set any time limit for review. Such details are
seemingly left to the Wyoming Supreme Court under the
authority granted it by section 9-4-114 (b) "to adopt rules
governing review," even to the extent of "supersed[ing]
existing statutory provisions."
court by section 9-4-114(b) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
to adopt rules governing review provides only that such rules "may supercede existing statutory provisions" (emphasis added). The author is aware
of no existing statutory provisions expressly creating an exclusive procedure and time limit for judicial review.
28. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-1001 (a) (1977). See supra note 10.
29. Again, the absence of any indication of exclusiveness of statutory review
seems to be uniformly typical of Wyoming judicial review statutes.
30. The relevant subsections of section 9-4-114 are (a) and (b) :
(a) Subject to the requirement that administrtaive remedies
be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or common-law
provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an
agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction,
or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is
entitled to judicial review in the district court for the county in
which such administrative action or inaction was taken, or in which
any real property affected by such administrative action or inaction
is located, or in the event no real property is involved, in the district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected by the administrative action or inaction resides or has
its principal place of business. The procedure to be followed in
such proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance
with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming
supreme court.
(b) The supreme court's authority to adopt rules governing
review from agencies to the district courts shall include but not
be limited to authority to determine the content of the record upon
review; the pleadings to be filed; the time and manner for filing
the pleadings, records and other documents; and the extent to
which supplemental testimony and evidence may be taken or considered by the district court. The rules adopted by the supreme
court under this provision may supersede existing statutory provisions.
WYo. STAT § 9-4-114(a) and (b) (1977).
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These rules promulgated by the supreme court, Rules
12.01-.12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure,
read together, establish no exclusive form of review. If Rule
petition for review the only method for obtaining judicial
12.03"1 is read in isolation, it could be construed to make a
review of agency action; but such an interpretation is rebutted by Rule 12.12, which expressly preserves declaratory
judgment and other independent actions "notwithstanding
any petition for review filed." 2 In view of this express
preservation of other remedies, the thirty-day time limit
in Rule 12.0411 must be read to apply only as it reads: to
petitions for review - not to independent actions.
If such other forms of action are "independent" of
review under Rule 12, then presumedly they must have an
independent jurisdictional base. Chief Justice Rose is correct
when he says that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
is not jurisdictional. But section 9-4-114 does not confer
jurisdiction 4 for judicial review of agency action only
through petitions for review. Indeed, its very language
simply declares that judicial review is available unless preThe proceedings for judicial review under Rule 12, W.R.A.P.,
shall be instituted by filing a petition for review in the district
court having venue. No other pleading shall be necessary, either
by petitioner or by the agency or. by any other party. All appeals
from administrative agencies and all proceedings for trials de novo
reviewing administrative action shall be governed by this rule.
No summons shall be necessary. Copies of the petition shall
be served without unnecessary delay upon the agency and the
parties in accordance with Rule 5, W.R.C.P.
Wyo. R. App. P. 12.03.
32. Wyo. R. App. P. 12.12. See supra note 14.
In a contested case, or in a noncontested case where a statute
33.
places a time limit on appeal, the petition for review shall be filed
within thirty (30) days after written, certified notice to all parties
of the final decision of the agency or denial of the petition for a
rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) days after
written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon, except
that upon a showing of excusable neglect based upon the failure
of a party to learn of the decision or action, the district court may
extend the time for filing the petition for review not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original time herein
prescribed. Concurrently with the filing of the petition, the appel'antshall order and arrange for the payment of a transcript of
the evidence necessary for the appeal, and written evidence of the
compliance with this requirement shall be served upon the agency
and all parties as provided in Rule 5, W.R.C.P.
Wyo. R. App. P. 12.04.
34. Section 9-4-114 of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act is jurisdictional. United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575
P.2d 749, 750-51 (Wyo. 1978).
31.
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cluded by law. This has the effect of opening agency action
to review under any otherwise existing jurisdictional authority; and, by virtue of article 5, section 10, of the Wyoming
Constitution, state district courts have general original
jurisdiction "of all causes both at law and equity" - now
including declaratory judgment actions." With the court's
removal of sovereign immunity from actions for declaratory
judgment, such actions may be brought against state agencies
for acting beyond their jurisdiction.
This somewhat detailed analysis simply reinforces my
agreement with the majority on the supreme court. It is
also nice that what little direct precedent exists on point in
Wyoming is supportive of the holding. In School Districts
Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 v. Cook,3" plaintiffs challenged an
order of the county superintendent of schools consolidating
school districts, by filing an original action for declaratory
and injunctive relief in the district court instead of (initially) pursuing their statutory remedy of appeal. 7 The
supreme court held that the existence of the statutory remedy
did not preclude the action for declaratory relief.as In
Mitchell v. Simpson39 the court (without discussing the issue,
which was raised) allowed a collateral attack on the jurisdiction of the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to enter a pooling order after the thirty-day period for
petitioning for review had run.4"
35.

The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes
both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters
of probate and insolvency and of such special cases and proceedings
as are not otherwise provided for. The district court shall also
have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in
which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in
some other court; and said court shall have the power of naturalization and to issue papers therefor. They shall have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior
courts in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law.
Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue writs of
mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition, injunction
and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any
person in actual custody in their respective districts.
WYo. CONST. art. 5,

§

10.

36. 424 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1967).
37. Now Wyo. STAT. § 21-6-115 (1977), which provides for judicial review
pursuant to the provisions of the APA.
38. 424 P.2d at 755.
39. 493 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1972).
40. But the court then proceeded to decide the "jurisdictional" question adversely to the plaintiff. Id. at 401-02.
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Thus, in Wyoming, law as well as policy supports the
decision of the court in RMOGA. But attorneys who practice
in the federal system and in other states should be aware
that this decision may put Wyoming out of line with the
"general" federal rule and probably that in the majority
of other states - when (as in RMOGA) there is a specific
statutory review route.
In the federal system, where the APA itself provides
no particular form of review,41 in the absence of a special
statutory review proceeding, a declaratory judgment action
or any other "applicable form of legal action" is available
(without any limitations period). 4 - Under such circumstances, therefore, the Wyoming and federal law would be
the same. When a federal statute exists, however, which is
similar to section 35-11-1001 of the Wyoming Environmental
Quality Act, section 703 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act" seems to require the opposite result: if an
adequate special statutory review procedure exists, it is
exclusive. Some federal courts" and commentators 5 appear
41. Indeed, in the federal system the APA itself has been interpreted not to be
jurisdictional. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
42. The first sentence in 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976) contains the controlling
provision:
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court
specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any
applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory
judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or
habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction.
See the application of the general presumption of availability of judicial
review of federal rules, in the absence of statutory review procedures, by
actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-49 (1967).
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976); Supra note 42.
44. See Independent Cosmetic Mfrs. and Distribs. v. HEW, 574 F.2d 553, 55455 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (challenge to FDA labeling requirement, outside the
statutory form and period for review, was barred where no "patent violation of agency authority" and not "damaging beyond the capability of the
statutory procedure to correct"). See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("even
where Congress has not expressly conferred exclusive jurisdiction, a special
review statute vesting jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off other
courts' original jurisdiction in all cases covered by the special statute").
45. Consider the unequivocal discussion of the subject in B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(1976):

§ 145. Exclusiveness of Statutory Review
Statutory review provisions are specific permissions by the
legislature for judicial review; they provide a legislative answer
in the affirmative to the question of availability of review. There
is, however, a basic corollary to the existence of statutory review
provisions: they take over the field so far as review is concerned.
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to take this restriction seriously. As Davis makes apparent
in his treatise, however, most federal courts actually do not
apply the rule woodenly." The majority of federal cases in
which nonstatutory review is barred involve legislation expressly making the specified review procedures exclusive."7
Occasionally, when the hardship of restricting access to the
judicial system seems especially severe, federal courts will
ignore even express statutory requirements for exclusive
review procedures.

The problem for the practitioner, of

The statutory road to review becomes the only road. The
statutory review provisions must be followed exactly in any.review
proceeding. This means that the review action must be brought:
(1) in the court specified in the statute;
(2) within the time specified in the statute; and
(3) in the form specified in the statute.
REVIEWING COURTS
... If a court provides that the review action is to be brought
in a specified court, the statutory direction must be followed.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Statutory review provisions commonly contain time limits during which review actions must be brought. These time limits must
be strictly observed; actions which are not filed within the time
specified must be dismissed, no matter how strong a case they may
present on the merits. In these cases the legislature has permitted
review but has recognized that agencies must know that, after a
reasonable time, their decisions and other acts are free from legal
danger. What constitutes a reasonable time is for the legislature
to decide. . . . Even though they may feel that the time allowed is
very short, the courts enforce even such a time limit without
question.
FORMS OF ACTION
If there is statutory provision for review, the review action
must be brought in the form of action specified by the legislature.
Here, too, the legislative discretion is very broad. If the statute
provides that review shall be obtained by filing a petition for review, by an injunction suit, by a proceeding in the nature of certiorari, by an action for mandamus, or by any other form of action
-in all these cases the legislative will must be respected; the review actions must be brought only in the forms specified.
CAVEAT
The rule that statutory review provisions must be followed
strictly is subject to a caveat: the provisions in question must be
adequate in enabling review to be obtained. The caveat is, however, more a matter of theory than practice. . . . In actual practice
the courts have not found inadequacy in any statutory review
provisions ...
46. DAvIS, supra note 21, at §§ 23.03-23.04 (1958 & Supp. 1970, 1976, 1982).
47. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977);
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1970);
Kornfield v. HEW, 307 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
48. The United States Supreme Court seems particularly prone to bend the
rule when presented with a "hard" case. In Oestereich v. Selective Serv.
Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, Cheyenne, Wyo., 393 U.S. 233 (1968), the plaintiff
was allowed to challenge revocation of his draft exemption by an action for
injunctive relief, despite a statutory provision expressly baring judicial
review except as a defense to a criminal prosecution. In Rusk v. Cort, 369
U.S. 367 (1962), the Court held that a statutory provision for review "in
habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise" did not bar a civil action
challenging the Secretary of State's determination that a person had forfeited his citizenship. Id. at 379.
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course, is in trying to divine when the rule will be applied
and when it won't. My best advice is to assume in the federal
system that statutory review is exclusive, follow that route
if within the limitations period, but, if the statutory period
has run, file for declaratory and injunctive relief and cite
decisions such as those at notes 47 and 48 supra in support.
In other states ,the result depends - at least in large
part - on the particular form of the state APA. In those
jurisdictions which have adopted section 7 of the Revised
Model Act,"0 nothing short of express preclusion of review
in favor of a special statutory procedure should bar challenge
through the APA-sanctioned means of declaratory relief.
On the other hand, when the state APA provides no form of
review, and leaves those affected by agency action to whatever remedies are available," special statutory review procedures are usually deemed exclusive. 1 If you find yourself
in a jurisdiction with an APA and rules of appellate procedure similar to Wyoming's, 2 you might want to argue
that RMOGA should be followed. Otherwise, you are simply
going to have to wind your way through that state's own
peculiar review procedures. My warning, however, is not
to be surprised if declaratory relief is unavailable after a
statutory limitations period has passed.
49. Section 7 of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act
provides:
SECTION 7. [DeclaratoryJudgment of Validity or Applicability of Rules.] The validity or applicability of a rule may be
determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the [District
Court of . . . County], if it is alleged that the rule, or its threat-

ened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff.
The agency shall be made a party to the action. A declaratory
judgment may be rendered whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon the validity or applicability of
the rule in question.
REV. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 7 (1961).
50. All too often, a challenger is still confronted with the present-day derivatives of the perogative writs-certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus-and
the task of deciding at his peril which writ is appropriate. In more enlightened jurisdictions, actions for injunctive and/or declaratory relief are
recognized as all-purpose remedies for agency action. See DAVIS, supra note
21, at §§ 24.01-24.07 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
51. See, e.g., City of Superior v. Committee on Water Pollution, 56 N.W.2d 501
(Wis. 1953); Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Clairton, 133
A.2d 542 (Pa. 1957).
52. The author at this writing has found no such jurisdiction.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/6

14

1983

Battle: Administrative Law, Wyoming Style
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

237

So, if you practice primarily in Wyoming, consider
yourself fortunate - at least in this respect. Our simplified
all-purpose procedure for judicial review of agency action
-

petition for reveiw within thirty days -

has just been

made even less hazardous than before, since now you are
not completely foreclosed from review if you miss the thirtyday deadline. Nevertheless, a few nuances in procedures for
obtaining judicial review remain - so a quick run through
the various avenues of relief might be helpful.
First, under the RMOGA holding, persons adversely
affected by state and local agency rules can now bring
declaratory judgment actions challenging the rules after
expiration of the thirty-day limitations period in Rule
12.04.11 The reasoning used by the court to support the
availability of declaratory relief should also allow actions
for injunctive relief (as well as mandamus or prohibition,
where applicable) against threatened application of a rule.
The court's treatment of the sovereign immunity defense,
however, only applies on its face to declaratory judgment
actions; it is possible that Retail Clerks 4 still operates as a
bar to actions against state agencies for relief other than
declaratory. Fortunately, such a restriction is largely irrelevant. When the defendant is a state agency, it is difficult
to imagine a declaratory judgment being flouted. Declaratory relief should, therefore, be sufficient.
Nothing in the RMOGA opinion suggests any time limit
on declaratory actions against rulemaking. Like constitutional challenges to statutes, "jurisdictional" challenges to
rulemaking should lie whenever a justiciable controversy
exists.55 I suppose that it is conceivable that the eightVs or
53. At least such challenges may be brought when no statutory limitations
period is expressly made exclusive. If there is a statutory provision for
exclusiveness, the application of RMOGA in such a context is debatable.
54. Retail Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884 (Wyo.
1975).
55. Such as surely was the case in RMOGA, despite the chief justice's opinion
to the contrary. See Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d
at 1174 (Rose, C.J., dissenting). Basically, whenever a person's activities
are threatened by government regulation-in this case subjected to permitting requirements-a challenge to the rules upon which the restrictions
are based should be ripe for adjudication.
56. "Within eight (8) years, an action . . . [ulpon a liability created by
statute other than a forfeiture or penalty." WYo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a) (ii)
(B) (1977).
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four57 year statute of limitations could be applied; but a
new period should begin to run with each application of
the rule - rather than only with its promulgation - making
any such limitations period largely insignificant.
A declaratory judgment action, however, is not the
equivalent of a petition for review. The court's holding in
RMOGA was expressly, and properly, limited to complaints
concerning "the validity and construction of agency regulations" or "the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be,
based."5 This means that only pure questions of law as to
the agency's "jurisdiction" - both constitutional and statutory - can be raised in this manner. Litigants should not
be allowed to use such out-of-time 9 declaratory relief as a
substitute for direct review of the record, the evidentiary
bases for the findings, or the observance of proper procedures." The only issue before the court should be: given the
agency's statement of reasons for adopting the rule," and
conclusively presuming support for those reasons in the
record, is the rule within the scope of the agency's statutory
and constitutional authority?
Besides having the force of reason and the court's own
language behind it, this reading of RMOGA is supported
by statements by the court in two previous cases. In Mitchell
v. Simpson, although the court allowed an independent action
attacking the jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas Conservation
57. "Within four (4) years, an action for . . . [ain injury to the rights of the

plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated." WYO. STAT.
§ 1-3-105(a) (iv) (C) (1977).
58. 645 P.2d at 1168. See also Id. at 1165 (similar limits to the court's holding
concerning sovereign immunity).
69. Declaratory judgment actions brought within the thirty-day review period
should entitle a plaintiff to the full range of review available under section
9-4-114(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. WYO. R. Civ. P. 72.1(c),
the predecessor to Wyo. R. App. P. 12, used to say as much; and Rule 12
should be interpreted accordingly.
60. Note, however, that section 9-4-103(c) of the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act allows challenges to compliance with the rulemaking procedures of that section to be brought within two years of the effective date of

the rule; so, within this two-year period, such procedural attacks should
lie.

61. A concise statement of the principal reasons for adoption of a rule is required by Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n v. Environmental
Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1979).
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Commission to issue a particular pooling order, it told the
plaintiff that any contention that the Commission was
"arbitrary in its finding" was a matter that he could raise
only by petition for review "and not by a collateral attack.""5
In School DistrictsNos. 2, 3,6, 9, and 10 v. Cook, the court
permitted a declaratory judgment action where "there was
no dispute as to the facts ... and all that remained to be
done was draw the legal conclusion." 3 The court, however,
pointedly went on to warn the plaintiffs: "Of course, litigants should bear in mind that resort to this remedy or to a
common-law remedy is narrow in scope and does not afford
the more complete review ordinarily offered by a statutory
appeal. . . ."" Attorneys are well advised, therefore, not to
miss the thirty-day deadline for petitioning for review. 5 An
unwaivering line of cases in the state hold that timely filing
of a petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional, and
many a petition for review has been dismissed on this basis. 6
Also, until the Wyoming Supreme Court says differently, counsel is well advised not to assume that RMOGA
applies to licensing and other contested case proceedings,
such as benefits determinations and employment dismissals.
Although the legal analysis used by the court would support
the same availability of declaratory relief to challenge the
jurisdiction of an agency to decide a particular contested
case, 7 different policy considerations are involved;"s and
62. 493 P.2d at 402.
63. 424 P.2d at 755.
64. Id. In this light, the court's preceding statement that "the courts are always
open to correct arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent action taken by an administrative official or board" should be read to refer to action which is
arbitrary and capricious purely as a matter of law, but not solely because
of absence of evidentiary support in the record.
65. Notice that the unusual wording of Rule 12.04 of the Wyoming Rules of
Appellate Procedure (supra note 33) seems to convert all statutory periods
for review to thirty days. If so literally construed, this appears to be
within the power given the court by section 9-4-114 of the Administrative
Procedure Act to adopt rules which "may supersede existing statutory
provisions." (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., Stagner v. Wyoming State Tax Comm'n, 642 P.2d 1296 (Wyo.
1982) ; Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 130102 (Wyo. 1979) ; Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Wyo. 1975) ; Curtis
v. Center Realty Co., 502 P.2d 365, 367 (Wyo. 1972).
67. The strongest sort of case for expanded availability of judicial review is a
case like McNeil v. Park County School Dist. No. 1, 635 P.2d 818 (Wyo.
1981), in which the Commissioner of Labor, without any statutory authority, assumed the power to adjudicate teachers' claims against their employer for money withheld from their paychecks.
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the court might not be willing to so extend RMOGA. If you
miss a thirty-day petitioning deadline, however, you should
attempt to challenge the order through a declaratory judgment action, argue that RMOGA applies, and make some
more law on the subject.
Finally, as discussed earlier, 9 until the meaning of
Wyoming Board of Equalization v. State" is cleared up,
affected interests cannot be assured that they will be allowed
to challenge the jurisdiction for rules when they are applied
in enforcement, licensing, or other agency regulatory proceedings. In this situation, as soon as a proceeding is initiated
in which a jurisdictionally vulnerable rule is to be applied,
counsel should file an independent action in court for declaratory judgment upon it. At least then the client will be
protected against having his challenge barred.
So, some uncertainty still exists as to the proper means
of challenging agency action in Wyoming; but it is certainly
no more uncertain than it was before RMOGA. And, at
least now the penalty for inadvertance or utilization of the
wrong review procedure has been considerably reduced. This
is, I believe, an appropriate step toward further disencumbering our already simplified procedures for judicial review
of agency action.
WHITE V. BOARD OFP TRUSTEES

In contrast with the Wyoming Supreme Court's independent stance in RMOGA, in White v. Board of Trustees7
the court placed itself squarely in line with the "general
rule" of administrative law, even to the extent of ignoring
its own most recent precedent on point. At issue was the
adequacy of notice for a hearing on a contested case. The
circumstances of the case provide a good illustration of how
the doctrine of "actual notice)) can prevail over severe defects
68. One significant difference is the usual absence of any danger of lack of
notice.
69. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
70. 637. P.2d 248 (Wyo. 1981).
71. 648 P.2d 528 (Wyo. 1982).
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in the formal notice of a hearing - even if the actual notice
does not come until the hearing itself.
Dr. John White was an assistant professor of music at
Western Wyoming Community College in Rock Springs. He
was under an employment contract with the college (and,
therefore, possessed a constitutionally protected property
interest in his job) when the president of the college served
him with notice of the administration's recommendation to
the Board of Trustees that his contract immediately be
terminated. This notice included advice concerning his rights
to a hearing, as well as to a statement of reasons for the
proposed termination and a list of witnesses against him.7"
Follownig Dr. White's request for a hearing and for notice
of reasons for the proposed termination, the college president
responded by providing him with a general allegation of
cause for the termination,"3 as well as an itemized list of
specific violations charged against him - possession of open
containers of alcohol in the dorm, serving the same to a
student in his room, quarreling with his colleagues and
college staff, not paying his rent, using profane language,
and failing to cooperate with a fire drill. 4 The final item
on the list of charges, however, was somewhat vague:
"7. Soliciting and participating in relationships with students in a manner which is violative of generally accepted
community standards." When White persisted with a forthright written request for a "description of relationships disallowed that I have allegedly violated," it became apparent
72. Except perhaps for its technical defect in failing to recite legal authority
under which the hearing was to be held, the notice first sent to Whitereproduced in the decision, Id. at 530-provides a good model for an initial

notice of termination from governmental employment.
'73. Id.

at 530-31.

This general allegation basically tracked those portions of

White's contract which he was allowed to have breached:

his duty to

comply with all college rules and regulations and his obligation to refrain
from conduct detrimental to the best interests of the college and to his
position. As discussed by the court, breach of this latter condition by engaging in immoral conduct is ample "cause" for termination, whether express in the contract or implied. Id. at 537-40.
74. Id. at 531. Attached to this written notice of reasons were, inter alia,
copies of three published college "policies" concerning the use of drugs
and alcohol: two prohibiting student usage on college property and at
college sponsored or supervised functions, and another prohibiting staff
use of drugs or alcohol "on school premises." No reference was made to
what specific charges these policies related; but it would seem logical that
they related to the only specified charge dealing with alcohol consumption

-the

one concerning possession of an open container in the residence hall.
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that the college president was indeed using a euphemism."5
The president's response was to transmit to White a copy
of a written statement by a male student accusing White
of inviting him to dinner in his residence hall room, and
there serving him alcoholic drinks and attempting to seduce
him."' A few days later White made a written request for
still further clarification," but no indication exists that the
president of the college responded.
So, Dr. White seemed to have a lot to worry about when
he showed up for his hearing - but at least it seemed that
the college had given him fair warning of every pellet in
the shotgun they intended to fire at him."' In opening statement, however, counsel for the college revealed that a substantial part of his case was to be based on the testimony
of four students concerning White's participation in the use
of marijuana and alcohol with the student members of his
rock band on road trips. True to that promise, the first
four witnesses called by the college did testify in detail to
such conduct on band road trips."0 When the first of these
witnesses began to testify concerning these actions, counsel
for Dr. White made an objection to any testimony concerning
conduct not covered by the notice of reasons, ° as well as any
75. Id. at 532. Omitted from the supreme court's discussion, but obvious from
the briefs, is the fact that it had already been indicated to Dr. White that
a charge of homosexual solicitation of students was a precipitating cause
for the termination. It had been emphasized by the college president in
asking for his resignation prior to the formal notice of proposed termination, and it had been indicated by copies of letters from White to a male
student given to White along with the detailed notice of reasons. Brief of
Appellees at 4-5, White v. Board of Trustees, 648 P.2d 528 (Wyo. 1982).
76. 648 P.2d at 532. In response to White's request, the president also enclosed statements by two other persons, neither of which had anything to
do with any sort of relationships with students (or drugs, alcohol, sex, or
the rock band which he instructed). Id.
77. White wrote the president asking for "all the evidence against me" and
repeating his request for a description of the college policy regarding
student/teacher relationships. Id.
78. Apparently feeling adequately prepared to deal with the charges of which
he had been given notice, neither White nor his attorney made a pre-hearing
request for a list of witnesses against him. Before the start of the hearing,
after the names of the college's witnesses were read into the record, White's
counsel did take the opportunity to interview three of them. Id. at 533.
79. Id. at 533-34. This testimony was followed by the introduction of evidence
as to White's homosexual conduct and other charges covered by the notice
of reasons furnished before the hearing. Id. at 534.
80. Id. at 533-34. The Court characterized this as a "half-hearted objection to
the subject matter" which did not include a complaint that conduct on the
band trips was not included in charge 7. Id. at 534. The excerpts from the
record included in the brief in support of appellant's petition for rehearing,
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evidence of actions occurring after the date such detailed
notice was furnished. He did not, however, in so many words,
claim surprise, move to strike the testimony, or go so far as
to move for a continuance, either when the testimony was
introduced or at the close of the state's case. In presenting
his own case, neither White nor any of his witnesses denied
such use of alcohol and marijuana on the band's road trips;
indeed, on cross examination, most band members called by
White to testify confirmed that this behavior had occurred
while under White's "supervision." Apparently Dr. White's
primary defense was that such use of drugs and alcohol by
college and high school youth in the Rock Springs area was
the accepted "community standard" and that, in any event,
it was not his job to police against such actions by his band
members on trips. At the close of all the evidence, White's
counsel again argued the absence of pre-hearing notice that
his client's relationships with students on band trips would
be in issue; but he still failed to move for a continuance to
allow him to meet the charge. When the Board of Trustees
made their written findings of fact, all of the findings that
supported their legal conclusion of cause for dismissal dealt
with White's misconduct in participating in the use of alcohol
and marijuana with his students on the rock band road trips.
Not surprisingly, Dr. White's major complaint on judicial review was lack of fair notice of the charges against
him."1 Although the supreme court acknowledged that White
was entitled to protection both by procedural due process
and by the contested case provisions of the Wyoming APA, 2
however, indicate that a quite strenuous continuing objection to this evidence
was registered at this point in the proceedings. Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 4, White v. Board of Trustees, 648 P.2d
528 (Wyo. 1982).
81. The District Court of Sweetwater County denied relief.
82. Therefore, section 9-4-107 (a) and (b) of the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act applied:
(a) Notice to be given; service of notice.-In any contested
case, all parties shall be afforded an opporunity for hearing
after reasonable notice served personally or by mail. Where the
indispensable and necessary parties are composed of a large class,
the notice shall be served upon a reasonable number thereof as
representatives of the class or by giving notice by publication in
the manner specified by the rules or an order of the agency.
(b) Statement in notice.-The notice shall include a statement
of:
(i) The time. place and nature of the hearing:
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it found neither of any avail to him. What both required
was fundamentally fair notice of the issues involved. Based
upon the "totality" of all the circumstances prior to, and in
the course of, his hearing, the court concluded that "appellant
to defend
received adequate notice of what he was expected
3 In one
parasurprise."
to
subjected
not
was
and
against
graph, the majority seemed to take the questionable position
that Dr. White received adequate pre-hearing notice when
the college furnished him with copies of its policies concerning the use of alcohol and drugs 4 and thereby put him
on "inquiry" as to any alcohol and drug-related conduct
which might be brought up in the hearing. 5 This, plus the
court's emphasis on the availability of discovery procedures,"
could be read to shift to the administratively accused the
burden of discovering the factual allegations against him
upon merely being apprised of the general rules being invoked. Most of the court's reasoning, however, is based on
the more solid proposition that, despite any absence of adequate pre-hearing notice, no prejudice against Dr. White
was shown where he did not indicate that he was caught off
guard and "surprised" by the college's change of tack, where
he made no motion for a continuance nor demonstrated a
need for one, and where he proceeded to try the case as if

83.
84.
85.

86.

(ii) The legal authority and jurisdiction under which the
hearing is to be held;
(iii) The particular sections of the statutes and rules
involved;
(iv) A short and plain statement of the matters asserted.
If the agency or other party is unable to state the matters in
detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may be
limited to a statement of the issues involved, and thereafter
upon application a more definite and detailed statement shall
be furnished.
WYo. STAT. § 9-45-107 (a) and (b) (1977).
648 P.2d at 535.
See supra note 74.
648 P.2d at 536-37. It is, perhaps, instructive that the two cases which
the court cited for this notion of "inquiry" notice have nothing whatsoever
to do with advance notice of the matters at issue in an administrative
hearing. Stagner v. Wyoming State Tax Comm'n, 642 P.2d 1296 (Wyo.
1982), concerned the adequacy of notice of a final agency decision that
starts the thirty-day period running for petitioning for judicial review.
Rodin v. State, ex rel. Cheyenne, 417 P.2d 180 (Wyo. 1966), was even further off point; it held that the holder of a municipal bond redeemable after
a certain date was put on inquiry and, therefore, was on notice to determine whether a call for redemption was made.
By essentially incorporating the rules for discovery in civil cases from the
Rules of Civil Procedure, Wyoming has adopted some of the most liberal
discovery provisions of any APA in the country, state or federal. See
section 9-4-107(g) and (h) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
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such evidence of his misconduct with students was not disputed. s7 As so viewed, the decision is but a harsh application
of a "general rule" of administrative law: actual notice can
come at any time, up to and including at the hearing itself,
and it is incumbent upon the parties to protect themselves
against any prejudice caused by such informality by moving
for a continuance to enable them to meet the new matter.
The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Rose 8 is, however, much closer to the mark established by recent Wyoming cases. In the chief justice's opinion, a violation of
procedural due process occurred when, despite Dr. White's
persistent efforts to obtain clarification of the charges, he
was not apprised of the factual allegations against him
before the hearing, but, indeed, was misled to believe that
the "student relationship" charge pertained to quite another
matter. The chief justice did not address the strongest part
of the majority opinion, that based on the absence of a showing of prejudice and the failure to move for a continuance.
He confined his attack instead to its weakest part - the
idea that notice is provided when the other party merely has
been placed on "inquiry;" but, as so limited, his view is
nicely supported by his own opinions for the court in the
two most recent Wyoming cases on point.
In Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School
District No. 1," the court reversed the termination of a
public school teacher because, in part, he was dismissed upon
a finding that he was "unable to control the conduct of his
students," while the allegation in his notice closest to this
subject only accused him of "failure to follow district policy" regarding student discipline. This the Powell majority
87. The court analogized this to trying issues not raised by the pleadings by
implied consent of the parties, as provided for in civil trials by Rule 15 (b)
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. 648 P.2d at 537. This rule
also states that, if objections are raised to evidence outside the pleadings,
the court shall freely allow the pleadings to be amended to conform to the
evidence unless the objecting party demonstrates that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice his case, in which case the court may grant a
continuance to allow him to meet the new evidence. The policy behind Rule
15(b) does seem quite applicable to administrative hearings, and the issue
should be similarly handled in the two contexts.
88. 648. P.2d at 540-43 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
89. 550 P.2d 1112, 1113-17 (Wyo. 1976).
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treated as inadequately precise to comply with due process
or the requirements of section 9-4-107(a) and (b) of the
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
The same term, with Rose again writing for the majority, in Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District
No. 1 v. Spiegel," the court similarly found a violation of
both due process and section 9-4-107 (a) and (b) in the school
board's denial of the affected teacher's timely motion for a
more detailed and definite statement than the board's quite
general allegations that his teaching philosophy had been
"in conflict with that of the administration" and that he
did not "have the ability to work harmoniously and cooperatively" with them. As Justice Rose pointed out in his
White dissent, the court in Spiegel distinguished that case
from its upholding of an equally general formal notice of
charges in Jergeson v. Board of Trustees of School District
No. 791 because there the accused teacher had failed to request a more specific or detailed statement from the administration.
If the White majority had been particularly concerned
with rationalizing its result with Wyoming precedent, it
could have differed with Justice Rose and refused to treat
either of Dr. White's requests for clarification of the "student relationships" charge as a motion for a more definite
statement under section 9-4-107(b), which would make
Spiegel rather than Jergeson applicable. I suppose that the
court could even have viewed the college's response as adequately detailed, given its view at that time of the case
against Dr. White (which changed by the time the hearing
rolled around). Or it could simply have held that the failure
to respond accurately was error, but not prejudicial error
in light of Dr. White's failure to move for a continuance to
protect himself at the hearing. The majority, however, chose
not to make any such fine distinctions. Indeed, it did not
even mention Powell or Spiegel, and only very briefly discussed Jergeson to support its point that a general charge
90. 549 P.2d 1161, 1170-72 (Wyo. 1976).
91. 476 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1970).
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"opening up a range of incidents" was sufficient when discovery procedures were available. 2
Perhaps tellingly, for substantive support for its holding
the court relied almost93 exclusively upon decisions from the
federal system. 4 These and other federal cases have established the "general rule" that, despite deficiencies in an
agency's formal notice, and sometimes even its failure to
respond to a motion to particularize, no subsequent challenge
is permitted to consideration of issues actually litigated if
there was actual notice and adequate opportunity to cure
any surprise. Such "actual" notice may come when evidence
on matters not previously noticed is introduced at the hearing. If the affected party is surprised, he is entitled to a
continuance; if he moves for one and it is denied, he may
claim prejudice on appeal. But, if he elects to proceed without requesting a continuance, and the prejudice to him is
not markedly evident in the record, he has little chance of
persuading a federal court to find reversible error. 5
Dr. White's argument, however, was not simply that he
was not given advance notice of charges raised for the first
time at his hearing; his complaint was that the college
actually misled him, by its responses to his specific requests
for clarification, into believing that no other factual issues
would be involved in his case. Even federal courts do not
hesitate to reverse when convinced that, neither before nor
during the hearing, was the accused actually apprised of
the charges which ultimately formed the basis for the
92. 648 P.2d at 536.
93. Id. Besides its one-sentence discussion of Jergeson, the only other Wyoming cases cited on the notice question were Glenn v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 440 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1968), for its simple dicta that fair notice of the
issues was required and the Stagner and Rodin decisions which, as explained
in note 85 supra, were hardly on point at all.
94. 648 P.2d at 536-37 (citing Kuhn v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 183 F.2d 839
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d
491 (D.C. Cir. 1950)). The court also cited decisions from other states
which involved applications of their equivalents of Rule 15 (b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to allow admission of evidence outside the
pleadings in civil cases.
95. See discussion and cases cited in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at § 97; 1
DAVIS, supra note 21, at §§ 8.04-8.05 (1958 & Supp. 1970, 1976); 3 DAVIS,
supra note 21, at § 14.11 (2d ed. 1980).
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agency decision. 96 Although Dr. White's problem was not
exactly of this nature, the fact that the Wyoming Supreme
Court chose not to analogize his case to those in this category may indicate how committed it now is to applying the
general rule - even, perhaps, to a harsh result. On the
other hand, the decision may just show how the court can
depart from its own precedent on procedure when it has
little sympathy for an appellant on the merits.
If the latter point of view is correct, then, in a more
"appealing" case, the court may return to the pattern of the
Powell and Spiegel decisions and hold agencies to a greater
responsibility for substance and accuracy in their prehearing notices than this case would indicate. For this
reason alone, agency counsel would be unwise to take White
as an invitation to sloppiness, vagueness, or indifference
in drafting notices to affected parties. Even if this decision
represents the "new" Wyoming law on the subject, as we
should assume that it does, agencies will henceforth pay a
price for any lack of concern with pre-hearing notice the complications of discovery, the interruptions of continuances, and the delays of both. This is due to the messages
clearly conveyed by this case to counsel for private parties.
Most obviously, the decision means that counsel cannot
count on getting administrative decisions overturned on
appeal due to gaps in whatever notice and "more definite"
statements are furnished prior to the hearing. From another
perspective, this means that private counsel interested in
being fully prepared to meet the government's case should
not rely exclusively on the formal notice received. The burden
is quite clearly on the defending party - both to prepare
his case and to preserve error on appeal - to use all the
means at his disposal to ferret out the details of the case
against him, and his attorney must act accordingly:
96. Typically, the agency is reversed if, after complaining of certain violations
in its notice and presenting its case on such charges at the hearing, it then
bases its decision on other grounds. See, e.g., NLRB v. Johnson, 322 F.2d
216 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1966); L & M Indus., Inc. v. Kenter, 458 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1972).
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1. He should move, and move repeatedly if necessary, for a more definite and detailed statement under
of the Wyoming Administrative
section 9-4-107(b)
97
Procedure Act.
2. He must utilize, to the extent the size of the
case justifies it, the civil discovery procedures incorporated by section 9-4-107(g) and (h), and go to court if
necessary to force compliance.
3. He should at least obtain, well in advance of
the hearing, a list of witnesses whom the agency plans
to call and determine the nature of their proposed
testimony.
4. Above all, if evidence on an issue of which his
client had no prior notice is introduced at the hearing,
he must make a forceful"8 objection right then on the
basis of surprise, state for the record the prejudice
caused by the surprise, and move for a continuance for
the time needed to adequately prepare to meet the new
evidence. If the motion is not granted then, he should
renew it at the end of the state's case and again, if
necessary, at the close of all the evidence. Private counsel simply cannot afford to be in such a hurry to conclude the hearing that he waives his client's claim of
prejudice from surprise. 9
In essence, counsel to a party to a contested case proceeding must treat it just as seriously as a civil action in
court - because the consequences are usually every bit as
great.
CITY OF EVANSTON V. WHIRL INN

Another important administrative law decision written
by Justice Raper, ° ° and one which did not even prompt a
97. If such a motion is denied, or inaccurately responded to, to the client's prejudice, it is then possible to argue that Spiegel applies rather than White.
98. As counsel for Dr. White suggested in his brief, perhaps an attorney should
now "bring with him to the hearing a large club with which to beat on
the table or on the Chairman when counsel wishes to emphasize his objections." Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, supra note
80, at 4.
99. If Wyoming follows the federal rule, a motion for a continuance (and a
request for a subpoena) is similarly required to protect a party's rights
to confrontation and cross-examination when hearsay evidence is admitted
against him in an administrative hearing. See Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389 (1971).

100. Along with White v. Board of Trustees, discussed above in text, and State
v. Fremont Energy Corp., summarized above in note 2.
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dissent by Chief Justice Rose,1"' is City of Evanston v.
Whirl Inn.10 2- In this case, the Evanston city council, after
a relatively informal hearing on renewal of Whirl Inn's
retail liquor license, decided to restrict its license to allow
the sale of alcoholic beverages from only its drive-up window," 3 effectively shutting down its lounge and disco. On
appeal, the district court conducted a trial "de novo," with
an advisory jury, following which it reversed the city's
decision and ordered the license renewed in full without the
limitations. The city appealed to the supreme court, complaining that the trial court erred in holding that the council
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in restricting the license,
that the court exceeded the proper scope and standard of
review in reaching such a decision, and that the court was
incorrect in concluding that the holder of a retail liquor
license had a property or liberty interest in its renewal entitling the holder to procedural due process before the license
could be diminished."0 4 Rejecting the first two of these contentions, the supreme court affirmed the district court without the necessity of considering the due process issue. On its
way to this result, the supreme court made some interesting
and significant law.
In considering the effect of the statutory provision for
trial de novo upon appeal of a refusal to renew a liquor
license,"o' the court's first step was to severely limit the
101. Chief Justice Rose did, of course, dissent in RMOGA and White. On the
other hand, he wrote the opinion for the court in Wyoming State Dep't of
Educ. v. Barber, summarized above in note 2.
102. 647 P.2d 1378 (Wyo. 1982).
103. Both parties, in their briefs, stated that the city, conceding a mistake,
actually meant also to permit sales inside the liquor store itself but still
not in the much larger lounge and disco areas. Brief of Appellant at 7,
City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d 1378 (Wyo. 1982); Brief of Appellee at 9, City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d 1378 (Wyo. 1982).
104. Other issues of little significance to administrative law were also raised
by the appellant and summarily disposed of by the supreme court. See 647
P.2d at 1387-89.
Upon an appeal the person applying for a license and claiming
105.
renewal preference shall be named as plaintiff, with the licensing
authority named as defendant. During the pendency of an appeal,
a renewal license denied by a licensing authority shall not be
granted to any other applicant. Upon notice of appeal the clerk
shall transmit to the clerk of the district court a certified copy of
the application, of each protest if any, and of the minutes recording the decision appealed from. The appeal shall be heard as a
trial de novo with evidence taken and other proceedings had as in
the trial of civil actions. The court may accept and consider as part
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statute's applicability. Without any explanation or citation
to authority,10 6 it stated: "With the adoption of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) in 1965, the
trial de novo provisions were replaced and all judicial review
of an administrative agency's action was required to be
conducted in accord with what is now § 9-4-114(c), W.S.
1977, Cum. Supp. 1982. "1°7 The court, however, went on to
explain that, since 1979, the governing body of a city or
town has not been an "agency" under the Wyoming APA.' °8
Therefore, trial de novo under section 12-4-104(f) was still
required on appeal of a city council's adverse decision on
the renewal of a liquor license.10 9 Precedent and separation
of powers principles, however, were applied by the court to
mean that, although the reviewing court had to conduct a
trial de novo, it was not to make a decision de novo, but was
instead to defer to the agency's decision unless, based on the
record and the evidence admitted in court, that decision was
found to be "arbitrary" or "capricious" or "an abuse of
discretion."' 10 In addressing the city's challenge to the lower
court's finding that the city council did act in such an arbitrary and capricious manner, the supreme court first confined its power to review such a finding by the trial court
by treating it as a "finding of fact." Its review so confined,
the court then concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to sustain the trial court's finding of arbitrariness and unreasonableness."' At this point, the supreme court had
provided Whirl Inn with a complete victory in retaining its
license, and, therefore, deemed it unnecessary to reach the
administrative due process issue raised." 2

106.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

of the record certified documents forwarded to the court by the
clerk of the licensing authority. The case shall be heard promptly
and the procedure shall conform to the Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure unless other procedures are provided for or required.
WYO. STAT. § 12-4-104(f) (1977) (emphasis added).
The only reference at all was by footnote to section 9-4-114(c), the subsection of the judicial review section of the APA which expresses the
standards and limited scope for judicial review of agency action. See 647
P.2d at 1384 n.6.
647 P.2d at 1384.
See Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-101(b) (i) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
647 P.2d at 1385.
Id. at 1382-84, 1385-86.
Id. at 1386-87.
Id. at 1387.
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As one can imagine, a good deal of hard reasoning and
some significant implications lie between the lines of this
simplified summary of the decision. A more detailed inspection of each of the major holdings is, therefore, in order.
The holding of greatest consequence to Wyoming practice may well be the one sentence in which the court states
that all statutory provisions for review of agency action by
trials de novo have been replaced by the judicial review provisions of the Wyoming APA. Since the court made this
statement while in the process of analyzing the proper
application of a trial de novo requirement to a body no
longer subject to the APA, it is perhaps understandable that
it would not choose to elaborate upon the matter. It seems
odd, however, that it failed even to cite the prior Wyoming
decision in which this issue had been analyzed and decided:
City of Casperv. Regan."3
At issue in the City of Casper case was the propriety
of de novo review of a decision by the city's Civil Service
Commission to discharge a fire department employee." 4
Section 15.1-294 of the Wyoming Statutes at that time
expressly provided for review of such commission termination decisions by "trial de novo" in the district court. The
Wyoming APA had, however, apparently" 5 become effective
prior to the commencement of the proceedings; and, to the
court, this made all the difference. It engaged in a precise
and literal reading of section 9-4-114 of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the predecessor to Rule 12 of the Wyo113. 433 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1967).
114. As the court discussed in Whirl Inn, at that time the Wyoming APA applied on its face to such city commissions. As also there discussed, now the
APA does not apply to "the governing body of a city or town." 647 P.2d
at 1384-85. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-101(b) (i) (1977 & Supp. 1982) (emphasis
added). This seems to leave the APA applicable to action by any municipal

commission, or other city agency, other than the "governing body"-i.e., the
city council-itself. Perhaps in recognition of this remaining application
of the APA to city commissions, the statutory provision at issue in City of
Casper was amended in 1980 to expressly provide for limited APA review
rather than trial de novo. See Wyo. STAT. § 5-5-113 (1977).
115. The court did not discuss, as it did in Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Pioneer
Canal Co., 464 P.2d 533, 542 (Wyo. 1970), whether or not there were "pend-

ing proceedings," making the APA inapplicable; therefore, one should assume that there were not.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/6

30

1983

Battle: Administrative Law, Wyoming Style
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

253

ming Rules of Appellate Procedure,11 to conclude that the
statutory requirement for trial de novo had been preempted
and that the lower court had erred in not following the
restricted procedures and limited scope of review provided
in the APA and the Rule.
Reading the last sentence of section 9-4-114(a), in
City of Casper the court noted its mandate that the procedure to be followed by a district court in reviewing agency
action "shall be in accordance with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court." Section
9-4-114(b) followed with an express statement that "[t]he
rules adopted by the supreme court under this provision
may supercede existing statutory provisions." That the supreme court had fully exercised this preemptive power was
clearly evidenced by the third sentence in Rule 12.03: "All
appeals from administrative agencies and all proceedings
for trials de novo reviewing administrative action shall be
governed by this rule." Rule 12.09 states that the court's
review is to be limited to a determination of the matters
specified in section 9-4-114(c). Rules 12.07 and 12.08
strictly limit the circumstances under which new evidence
may be received by the reviewing court, and no exception
is made for circumstances in which previously there existed
a right to trial de novo. Upon reading these provisions of
the APA and Rule 12 in logical sequence, the result was
clear: preexisting statutory rights to trial de novo were
replaced by the limited judicial review on the record specified in section 9-4-114 (c).
Perhaps the APA and Rule 12 could have been read
differently than in City of Casper."' Perhaps the general
116. Section 9-4-114 has been amended since the City of Casper case was decided,
but in no respect relevant to the decision or this analysis.
The supreme court's rules governing judicial review of agency action
were at that time contained in Rule 72.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure. In 1978, all provisions of Rule 72.1 relevant to this discussion
were transferred verbatim to various paragraphs in Wyo. R. App. P. 12.0112.12.
In the interest of clarity, the court's reading of subsections (c), (g),
(h), and (i) of old Rule 72.1 in City of Casper will be treated as construction of WYo. R. App. P. 12.03, 12.07, 12.08, and 12.09.
117. E.g., Rule 12.03 could be read to distinguish between "appeals" and trials
de novo and merely provide for both to be initiated by petitions for review,
with Rules 12.07, 12.08, and 12.09 only applying to appeals (admittedly a
strained construction).
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repealing clause which accompanied passage of the Wyoming
APA gave no clear indication of such legislative intent.1 '
Nevertheless, the construction given these provisions by the
court in City of Casper is abundantly reasonable and provides a much more solid basis for this rule of state law
than the one-sentence statement in Whirl Inn would indicate.
Inferential support for this rule can be found in the
fact that when the Wyoming Legislature amended section
9-4-114 (c) in 1979 to track the scope of review in the federal
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, it took everything from the federal
rule except paragraph 2 (F), directing the federal reviewing
court to vacate agency action found to be "unwarranted by
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court." Perhaps also indicative of
the different legislative approach in Wyoming was the absence, from the outset, in the Wyoming APA of anything
similar to the recognition of trials de novo found in section
554 (a) (1) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act or
the preference for special statutory judicial review procedures contained in section 703 thereof."' (This opposite rule
in the federal system should be remembered by counsel when
practicing in that jurisdiction.)
118. 1965 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 108, § 17 (annotation to § 9-4-115 of the Wyoming APA), reads:
All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed, but this repeal does not
affect pending proceedings. Provided, however, to the extent not
inconsistent herewith existing procedures provided for by statute
shall be deemed preserved and the procedures provided for by this
act shall be in addition and supplementary thereto.
In Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Pioneer Canal Co., the court interpreted the "pending proceedings" exception in the repealing clause to require statutory trial de novo review of a Board of Control abandonment
proceeding already underway when the APA became effective on January
1, 1966. 464 P.2d at 542.
The court stated, however, that the decision would "make little contribution to the body of law of this state for the reason it is inconceivable
that the Administrative Procedure Act.

. . would not now be applicable

to any agency proceeding." Although this statement reaffirms the City
of Casper holding, it should be noted that the specific statute in issue in
Wheatland IrrigationDistrict was repealed in 1973 to be replaced by provisions not expressly providing for trials de novo from Board decisions in
water rights abandonment proceedings. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-3-401 to -402
(1977).
119. See the first sentence of 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976) (reproduced in note 42
above).
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Given the large number of statutes still on the books
which call for review by trial de novo"2 I - expressly or by
use of language to the same effect - it is, as a matter of
policy, desirable that such a disordered and unpredictable
array of instances of special judicial attention be abolished
in favor of the single, deferential form and standard of
review under the APA. I am convinced, now that I have
read City of Casper, that this is what the supreme court
intended when it adopted the predecessor to Rule 12. I would
feel better, however, if the court had reaffirmed this holding
with a little more fanfare in Whirl Inn. The danger, of
course, is that counsel will not be aware of this holding,
will be involved in one of the sixteen or so proceedings for
which trial de novo is ostensibly provided on review, will
read the relevant statute, and will not take seriously his
participation at the agency level, relying to his detriment
on the opportunity to make his case in the reviewing court.
120. See WYo. STAT. § 12-4-104(f) (1977) (appeal from denial of liquor license
renewal); WYO. STAT. §§ 36-2-206, 208 and 210 (1977) (appeal from decision by Board of Land Comissioners); WYO. STAT. . 30-5-113(b), (e)
(1977) (appeal of rule, order, or decision of the Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission); WYo. STAT. § 31-7-133 (1977) (review of decisions of the
Motor Vehicle Division regarding drivers' licenses) ; WYO. STAT. 6 39-1-306
(1977) (review of any order of the Board of Equalization); WYo. STAT.
§ 17-1-1001 (1977) (review of Secretary of State's failure to approve any
documents under the Wyoming Business Corporation Act or revocation of
authority of foreign corporations to transact business) ; WYO. STAT. . 302-312 (1977) (appeals from the decisions of the State Tnspector of Mines
regarding adoption of rules) : Wyo. STAT. 6 30-3-411 (1977) (appeals from
the State Inspector of Coal Mines from decisions regarding the adoption
of rules) ; WYo. STAT. 6 30-4-207 (1977) (appeals from orders of the State
Inspector of Mines): WYO. STAT. 4 33-16-312 (1977) (appeals from decisions of the State Board of Embalming regarding the revocation or suspension of funeral directors' and undertakers' licenses) ; WYO. STAT. § 3323-110(d) (1977) (appeals from decisions of the Board of Examiners in Optometry regarding the revocation, suspension, or refusal to renew licenses) ;
WYO. STAT. § 33-25-112(d) (1977) (appeals from decisions of the Board
of Physical Therapy regardinz the denial, suspension, or revocation of
licenses); WYo. STAT. . 33-27-109(d) (1977) (appeals from the Board of
Psychologist Examiners' decisions regarding the suspension or revocation
of licenses) ; WYO. STAT. 6 35-2-107 (1977) (review of all decisions of the
State Department of Public Health regarding licensing of hospitals and
related institutions) ; WYO. STAT. § 41-8-119 (1977) (appeal from orders
of the Boards of Directors of Watershed Improvement Districts).
Two statutes are worded in terms requiring the procedures on appeal
to be "the same as that provided by law in the cases of appeals from a
justice court to the district court." Wyo. STAT. § 33-10-111 (1977) (appeals
from the decisions of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners regarding the
refusal, revocation, or suspension of licenses); WYo. STAT. § 41-4-406
(1977) (appeals from decisions of the Board of Control). When, in 1975,
new rules of civil and criminal procedure for justice of peace courts took
effect, in them were provisions eliminating the preexisting rights to trial
de novo on appeal to district courts. See Wyo. R. CRiM. P. J. C. 23; WYO.
R. Civ. P. J. C. 7.
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Or, the district judge and opposing counsel may make the
same assumption as to the availability of de novo review,
and a decision may be made only to be reversed by the
supreme court for failure to adhere to the APA and Rule 12.
In either case, this remains an undesirable trap for the
unwary. Many significant decisions by agencies with very
substantial powers - e.g., the Board of Land Commissioners,
the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, the Board of
Equalization, and the licensing boards for many professions 2 ' - are, on the faces of their particular statutes,
subject to de novo review. The best solution would be for
the legislature, assuming it agrees with the supreme court
as to policy, to amend each and every existing statutory
provision for trial de novo, or anything similar, to provide
for "review pursuant to the Wyoming APA, Section 9-4-114,
and Rule 12, Wyo. R. App. P."' 2 On the other hand, the
Wyoming Legislature might well decide - in a few or all
of the existing cases - that it does indeed prefer review to
be by trial de novo. In this event, the legislature certainly
should have the authority to override the court's rulemaking
and interpretation of section 9-4-114, and expressly insist
123
upon de novo review in whatever instances it wishes.
121. See supra note 22.
122. In the absence of such legislative action, I hope that this article comes to
the attention of every Wyoming lawyer.
123. The stickiest issue which can arise under the City of Casper and Whirl Inn
holdings is the effect of section 9-4-114 and Rule 12 on statutory provisions
for trial de novo enacted after the APA and the predecessor to Rule 12
became effective (on January 1 and March 21, 1966, respectively), but
which do not expressly override the APA or the appellate rule. Only two
statutes presenting this problem have come to the author's attention: Wyo.
STAT. § 31-7-133 (1977) (review of decisions of the Motor Vehicle Division
of the State Tax Commission regarding driver's licenses), and Wyo. STAT.
§ 39-1-306 (1977) (review of any order issued by the Board of Equalization
-or its alter ego, the State Tax Commission). It is unclear whether this
last-mentioned law controls or another 1973 version of the same which does
not provide for a trial de novo. See Wyo. STAT. § 39-1-306 (1977 & Supp.
1982) ; Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1300 n.6
(Wyo. 1979).
The problem was not addressed in Irvine, but it may well arise. Its
resolution should turn on the always difficult question of legislative
intent. To avoid what is often a futile inquiry, the court could simply
apply the rules of statutory construction that the later statute prevails
over the earlier and that specific legislation controls over the more general. Application of either rule would seem to favor giving effect to the
statutory provisions for de novo review. Such a result would be consistent
with a literal reading of the last sentence in section 9-4-114(b) : "The
rules adopted by the supreme court under this provision- may supercede
existing statutory provisions." WYo. STAT. § 9-4-114(b) (1977) (emphasis
added).
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Hopefully, however, the legislature will see the wisdom of
limited judicial review and a single form of action and
refrain from this latter course.
All of the preceding analysis of APA preemption of
statutory de novo review was, of course, irrelevant to the
court's decision in Whirl Inn, because, since 1979, city councils have not been "agencies" whose actions are subject to
the APA. The statutory provision in section 12-4-104(f) of
the Wyoming Statutes for trial de novo upon appeal of the
denial of renewal of a liquor license, therefore, was still
applicable. The court made clear, however, that, despite the
language of the statute, 2 4 this was not to be a decision de
novo. An unwavering line of Wyoming case law 12 had

established the proposition that, although the district court
was to admit new evidence and otherwise conduct a "trial,"
when presented with such a statutory provision for de novo
review, it was not to make an independent decision. Instead
the court was to consider all the evidence, both that introduced at trial and that contained in the administrative
record, in order to decide whether the licensing authority
acted illegally or arbitrarily, whether it abused 12its discretion,
and whether its decision was procured by fraud.

This construction the court, as it had indicated occasionally in the past, held to be mandated by the separation
of powers doctrine embodied in article 2, section 1, of the
Wyoming Constitution. 2 Although such an application of
the separation of powers doctrine is not without precedent,'
124.
125.

See supra note 105.
The court relied primarily on Howard v. Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 214 P.2d
737 (1950), but also cited L. L. Sheep Co. v. Potter, 67 Wyo. 348, 224 P.2d
496 (1950). It could have gone on and cited other such cases, standing for
the same proposition, also involving de novo review of decisions of the Board
of Land Commissioners, e.g.: Rayburne v. Queen, 78 Wyo. 359, 326 P.2d 1108
(1958); Banzhaf v. Swan Co., 60 Wyo. 201, 148 P.2d 225 (1944); Miller v.
Hurley, 37 Wyo. 344, 262 P.2d 238 (1927); Cooper v. McCormick, 10 Wyo.
379, 69 P. 301 (1902).
The same holding has been consistently expressed when statutes providing for trials de novo from decisions of other state agencies have been
involved (prior to passage of the APA, of course)--e.g., the Board of
Equalization in J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Hudson, 348 P.2d 73 (Wyo.
1960).
126. City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d at 1384-86 (Wyo. 1982).
127. Id.
128. See 2 AM.JuR.2d Administrative Law §§ 579, 613 (1962).
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it is somewhat curious; and why the court invoked it when
it could have based its holding solely on statutory construction is not altogether clear. Regardless of its basis, this
application of the statute does put the district court in the
position of performing a hybrid function and certainly gives
it an unusual perspective on the council's decision: the reviewing court determines whether the council acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion in light of all kinds of evidence
that may never have been brought to the council's attention.
It is difficult to see how this helps to preserve the separation
of powers, but perhaps the court feels that it strikes some
sort of a happy medium between limited review confined to
the record and an actual trial and judgment de novo. In any
event, the Wyoming Supreme Court has followed this approach for a half century in one context or another, so its
application to this context is hardly startling.
So far as I can tell, however, the impact of this aspect
of the decision is presently confined to its precise context:
judicial review initiated by an aggrieved applicant for renewal of a liquor license.1 2-1 This is because section 12-4104(f) is the only existing statutory provision that I have
found which gives a right to trial de novo from the decision
of an administrative body which is not an "agency" under
the Wyoming APA 13 ° - in this case "the governing body of
a city or town." In this particular cntext, therefore, it could
be said that city councils had greater discretion before they
were exempted from the APA.
As to the precise standard of review to be applied by
the trial court, the supreme court was not terribly precise.
The statement in the opinion probably destined to be most
often quoted on the point is "when an appeal from an administrative agency is heard as a trial de novo in district court,
the only issues that the court may properly consider are
whether the agency acted illegally or arbitrarily exercised
its discretion or whether the agency's action was procured
If the reasoning used in note 123 supra is adopted, this hybrid form of review would also be iequired (by separation of powers) for post-APA statutes providing for de novo review.
130. WYo. STAT. § 9-4-114(b) (i) (1.977 & Supp. 1982).
129.
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by fraud." 1 ' The court seemed to equate the often-used
phrase "abuse of discretion" with arbitrary exercise of
discretion, and, apparently feeling that it was helpful, went
on to quote from the attempt in Howard v. Lindmier to
define abuse of discretion: "wrong and unreasonable."' 2
Elsewhere in Howard v. Lindmier, that court had stated
that abuse of discretion should be found if the reviewing
court determined that the agency "might not reasonably,
under the same set of facts [including those proven in court],
have come to a different conclusion."' This, of course,
sounds suspiciously like the "substantial evidence" standard
of review. Indeed, in Rayburne v. Queen this statement in
Howard was explained to mean just that:
This is another way of saying that the findings of
the board if supported by substantial evidence
should be approved by the court on the trial de
novo, and we think that such substantial evidence
may consist of competent testimony either (a)
taken before the board and properly preserved or
134
(b) adduced in the trial before the court ....
In sum, all this verbiage seems to add up to virtually the
same standards for judicial review provided in section
9-4-114(c) (ii) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act. In fact, the court seemed to say as much when it equated
the pre- and post-APA standards for review of agency decisions subject to statutory provisions for trial de novo,
saying that the biggest change made by the APA "was not
in the issues presented to the reviewing court," but "in what
evidence the reviewing court could consider on appeal.""'
Of course, the introduction of new evidence at trial can
substantially affect the application of the standard of review.
When an agency decision is being reviewed on the record,
131. 647 P.2d at 1385-86 (Wyo. 1982).
132. Id. at 1386 (quoting Howard v. Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 214 P.2d 737, 740

(1950)).
133. Howard v. Lindmier, 214 P.2d at 739 (1950).
134. 326 P.2d at 1109 (1958).
135. City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d at 1384 (Wyo. 1982).
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even the substantial evidence rule' is interpreted not to
require very "substantial" evidence at all to support a decision." 7 On the other hand, when the court's perspective is
enhanced by all the relevant evidence that the parties might
see fit to introduce at trial,' s it seems quite likely that, as
a practical matter, the court's review will become quite a
bit less deferential. Indeed from the description of the proceedings below by the supreme court' and in the briefs on
appeal, 4 ' the strong showing made in the trial court by
Whirl Inn, and the emphasis which the judge placed on the
evidence brought before him and his advisory jury, it is easy
to see how the tape-recorded - but untranscribed 4' record before the city council could have come to seem "insubstantial" by comparison.
As if such an enhanced perspective did not give the
"reviewing" court enough independence, the supreme court
held that its conclusion that the city's action was unreasonable and arbitrary and, therefore, an abuse of discretion was
a finding of fact not to be disturbed if supported by "sufficient evidence." "The judgment of the district court must
be sustained unless it was clearly erroneous or contrary to
the great weight of the evidence."' 42 The court acknowledged
its oft-repeated statement that in its review of a district
court decision on appeal from an administrative agency,
"the deference owed the fact finder's determination of fact
belongs to the administrative agency, not to the district
court."' 43 Here it decided, however, that what was normally
136. In theory (although probably not in application), the substantial evidence
rule justifies somewhat less deference than the general "arbitrary and

capricious" standard of review. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at §§ 210,
215.
137. "'By substantial evidence' we are referring to relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as supporting the agency's conclusion, although it means more than a mere scintilla of evidence." Wyoming State
Dep't of Educ. v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681, 689 (Wyo. 1982).
138. The court, in fact, held that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, particularly

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Rule 402, providing for admission of all relevant evidence (not otherwise
barred by statute or rule), were applicable to such trials de novo. See
City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d at 1388 (Wyo. 1982).
Id. at 1386-87.
Briefs of Appellant and Appellee, supra note 103,
See 647 P.2d at 1381-82 n.3, 4.
Id. at 1386.
Id. (quoting Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Hopkins, 602 P.2d 374, 377

(Wyo. 1979).
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a question of law - the correct application of the standard
of review - was a question of fact when the district court
sat not as an appellate court, but as a trial court. After
giving such deference to the trial judge's conclusion, it was
hardly surprising that the supreme court affirmed.
Thus, the supreme court has given the district courts a
version of the old "first-the-bad-news-now-the-good-news"
routine. The power to make a decision de novo, first seemingly taken from the trial court by the supreme court's
application of the doctrine of separation of powers, was
reinvigorated, although in an unaccustomed form, through
the court's invitation to the trial court to judge the council's
decision as it sees fit - so long as it casts its conclusion in
the language of limited review and has some reasonable
basis for its finding.
In light of this opinion, how should counsel represent
an applicant for renewal of a liquor license? Quite obviously,
the answer depends on who is the licensing authority: the
city or the county. If it is the county, the licensee must take
his very best shot in the renewal hearing before the county
commissioners,' because the City of Casper holding, reiterated in Whirl Inn, confines him to judicial review on the
record under the restricted standards of the APA. Indeed,
since it is a "contested case,"' ' he will have no opportunity
to introduce additional evidence in court.' On the other
hand, the fact that it is a contested case entitles the renewal
144. His counsel should ask for a continuance if unanticipated opposition surfaces in order to prepare fully to meet the challenge. See discussion of this
critical point in analysis of the White case herein.
145. " 'Contested case' means a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after
an opportunity for hearing." WYO. STAT. § 9-4-101(b) (ii) (1977). A proceeding involving renewal of a liquor license by the county certainly fits
this definition. Section 12-4-104(c) of the Wyoming Statutes gives a renewal applicant a "preference right;" and subsections (a) and (b) to this
section require this legal right to be determined after a hearing. Wyo.
STAT. § 12-4-104 (a), (b) and (c) (1977). See Glenn v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 440 P.2d 1 (1968).
146. Except "in cases involving fraud or involving misconduct of some person
engaged in the administration of the law affecting the decision." WYO. R.
App. P. 12.08.
Rule 12.07 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the
court to take evidence on required matter not preserved by the agency
and of which there is no record.
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applicant to the full rights of adversarial participation at
the agency level protected by sections 9-4-107 through 113
of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The message is to utilize these APA provisions to the fullest extent
a given case will justify.147
When the city is the licensing authority, however, counsel for the renewal applicant can afford to save some of his
energy for the de novo review his client is entitled to if he
loses. Indeed, because the APA and, therefore, its contested
case provisions do not apply, he will have no procedural
rights before the city council that are not required by procedural due process,' 48 beyond those few contained in the
liquor licensing statutes'49 and whatever procedures are
afforded by the council itself. If the license is not renewed,
the trial de novo should be taken just as seriously as any
other trial - by all parties. Counsel for the city obviously
cannot rely on the record below to sustain the council's
decision. 5 0 Attorneys for all parties should assume that the
trial judge is going to be more strongly influenced by what
he hears in court than by what is on the record. He is re147. The same advice, of course applies whenever a statutory right to de novo
review has been preempted by the APA. See supra note 120.
148. Although the court seems to assume that the council hearing can be quite
informal, City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d at 1385 (Wyo. 1982),
it is the author's opinion that the "preference right" conferred on renewal
applicants by section 12-4-104(c) is a "property" right under the "entitlement" analysis of federal constitutional law. See Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) ; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). It must be noted, however, that in Whirl Inn the
court expressly refused to decide the "property right question," 647 P.2d
at 1378, and that it was also avoided in the only other case before the
Wyoming Supreme Court to raise the issue, Whitesides v. Council of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1957). The Wyoming Supreme
Court, of course, has the power to construe the statute either to confer or
not to confer a property right, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) ; and,
until it has spoken, the question is up in the air.
Assuming that a property right in a renewal exists, the remaining
question would be "what process is due." Using the three-part balancing
test applied by the United States Supreme Court in such cases as Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft and Matthews v. Eldridge, it is
the author's opinion that the process a renewal applicant is due before a
city council should approximate the basic procedures required for a "contested case."
149. Basically, these consist of public notice of the renewal hearing, holding
of the hearing at least thirty days prior to the expiration date of the
present license, and requiring certain findings by the council if the renewal is denied. See WYO.STAT. § 12-4-104(a) and (b) (1977).
150. But he should have ensured that the entire hearing before the city council
was recorded and transcribed for the appeal.
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quired to apply the standard of limited review discussed
above; but, because his decision is treated by the supreme
court as a factfinding, each counsel is well advised to approach the trial as if he must convince the judge of the
merits of his position - because this may, as a practical
matter, be true.
WALKER V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Saved until last for discussion is the first significant
administrative law decision of the April, 1982, term.' 5 ' Perhaps the supreme court was not fully in shape so early in
the season and -

like other Wyoming teams on occasion

-

out. 5 -

Whatever the reason,
still needed to get a few kinks
the court's opinion in Walker v. Board of County Commissioners does merit a critical examination.
This controversy was introduced into the administrative
system when both the Walkers and the Gustafsons applied
for newly-available retail liquor licenses for their competing
businesses in the small incorporated community of Centennial
in Albany County. Following a consolidated hearing on the
two permit applications,' 53 the Board of County Commissioners decided to issue only one license and to issue it to the
Gustafsons.5 4 The Walkers petitioned the district court to
review both the denial of their application and the granting
of that of their competitor. The district court sustained the
decision of the county commissioners, holding that neither
procedural due process nor the "contested case" requireWalker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1982).
Certainly, any difference in quality should not reflect adversely on the
author of the Walker opinion; Justice Rooney also wrote one of the bestreasoned administrative law decisions of the term, Rocky Mountain Oil
and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1982), discussed above.
153. This is the preferred (if not the required) procedure where, as a practical
matter, two or more pending applications are mutually exclusive. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); Pollack v. Simonson,
350 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
154. After an initial, relatively informal, hearing and decision adverse to the
Walkers, the Board of County Commissioners, pursuant to their "Rules
of Practice" granted the Walkers' request for a hearing in accordance with
the contested case procedures of the APA. Following this hearing, the
Board entered findings of fact and conclusions of law which resulted in
again denying Walkers' application and issuing the license to the Gustafsons. 644 P.2d at 776; Brief of Appellants at 9-11, Walker v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1982); Brief of Appellees (Gustafsons) at 7, Walker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1982).
151.
152.
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ments of the Wyoming APA applied to the commissioners'
action on the applications for initial licenses and that, in
any event, the Walkers had no right of appeal to the court
from either the denial of their application or the granting
of the Gustafsons'. The Walkers appealed to the Wyoming
Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision."'
The supreme court's opinion can be described most
charitably and succinctly as holding that, because an aggrieved applicant for an initial liquor license has no right
of appeal from its denial, a competitor-applicant whose only
complaint on appeal is that the license should have been
issued instead to him has no standing to appeal. Unfortunately, the majority's opinion is not so brief and restricted.
On its way to this result, the court felt the need to survey
virtually all the various circumstances in which liquor licensing cases can arise and be appealed.' 50 Not surprisingly,
within this dicta lies the trouble. Although, in the context
of county licensing, the court correctly held (1) that an applicant denied an initial liquor license has no right of appeal,"' (2) that a liquor licensee denied renewal of his
license has a right of appeal, 5 ' and (3) that people residing
in the vicinity of the proposed license and residents of the
affected county have the right to participate in renewal and
initial licensing hearings conducted according to the APA
and to appeal in order to protect their "welfare" and "desires""' - it left the incorrect impression that (1) a renewal
155. An unrelated issue in the case concerned the issuance of a dance hall license
to the Gustafsons. First the district court and then the supreme court
held that this issue had become moot when the dance hall license was not
renewed. 644 P.2d at 773-74.
156. Id. at 774-75.
157. Id. at 775. WYo. STAT. § 12-4-104(e) (1977) provides:
An applicant for a renewal license or permit may appeal to
the district court from an adverse decision by the licensing authority. No applicant for a new license shall have a right of appeal from the decision of the licensing authority denying an application.
158. 644 P.2d at 775; WYO. STAT. § 12-4-104(e) (1977). Of course, as held in
Whirl Inn, the scope of the appellate review depends on whether the city
or the county is the licensing authority: if it is the city, then review is
"modified de novo;" if the county, then "on the record" pursuant to the
APA. See supra notes 113-40 and accompanying text.
159. 644 P.2d at 775. The court reached this conclusion from a combined reading
of section 9-4-114(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which affords
judicial review to "any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by
a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action
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applicant would not himself have the protection of the APA
at his hearing and (2) that neither would an initial
applicant."'
Fortunately, the first of these incorrect impressions
was counteracted by other - but better - dicta in the subsequent case of City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn."6 There, in
distinguishing between city and county liquor license renewals, the court not only held that the judicial review provisions of the APA applied to county, but not city, renewal
decisions; it also implied that the contested case procedural
protections applied as well.' 2 The correct assumption had
also been made previously in the case of Glenn v. Board of
County Commissioners, in which the court noted that, on
appeal from denial of renewal of a liquor license, "the parties agree, and properly so, that the proceeding was a 'conor inaction," and the following portion of section 12-4-104(b) which lists
the criteria for issuing or renewing a liquor license:
A license or permit shall not be issued, renewed or transferred if the licensing authority finds from evidence presented at
the hearing:
(i) The welfare of the people residing in the vicinity of the
proposed license or permit premises shall be adversely and seriously
affected;
(ii) The purpose of this title shall not be carried out by the
issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit;
(iii) The number, type and location of existing licenses or
permits meet the needs of the vicinity under consideration;
(iv) The desires of the residents of the county, city or town
will not be met or satisfied by the issuance, renewal or transfer
of the license or permit; or
(v) Any other reasonable restrictions or standards which may
be imposed by the licensing authority shall not be carried out by
the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit.
WYO. STAT. § 12-4-104(b) (1977).
160. 644 P.2d at 775. The court also discussed the alternative procedures, judicial and administrative, for revocation or suspenison of a liquor license;
but these are relatively straightforward and were not even peripherally in
issue in the case. See WYo. STAT. §§ 12-7-201 (b), 12-8-101, and 12-7-201 (d)
(1977).
161. 647 P.2d 1378 (Wyo. 1982).
As a result, judicial review of liquor-licensing decisions by the
162.
governing bodies of cities and towns, as opposed to those by
counties, is no longer governed by the WAPA. ....
we should also note that not only does Evanston's exception
from the WAPA alter the standards on judicial review, it also
frees the city from certain procedural requirements in its decision
making. . . . We do not question the legislative wisdom in providing the appeal procedure it has, even though, as it now stands,
liquor decisions by cities and counties are, for purposes of administrative procedure, treated differently.
Id. at 1385.
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tested case,' as that term is defined in [§9-4-101(b) (ii) of
the APA] .... "I"
The answer, however, to the question of whether or not
the contested case procedures of the APA apply to county
liquor license renewals can best be given by looking to the
APA itself. The Board of County Commissioners is clearly
an "agency."' 64 A contested case includes licensing "in which
legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by
law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity
for a hearing.... Moreover, any licensing decision is expressly subject to contested case procedures whenever a hearing is first required."'6 The statute governing liquor licensing expressly requires a hearing to precede a renewal decision (or, for that matter, a decision on an initial application) ;'1" and it goes on to create a "preference right" in a
renewal at the same location.6 8 These statutory provisions
in the APA and the state liquor laws, read together, can
only result in the contested case procedures of the APA
applying to all hearings by a Board of County Commissioners on renewal of a liquor license - regardless of the
outcome, and regardless of who, if anyone, appeals.' 69
Turning to liquor license renewal decisions by a city,
however, the procedural protections afforded at the hearing
may well depend on who is asking for them. ° As suggested
earlier, 71 the owner or holder of the preexisting license
should have a "property" interest in renewal at the same
location which will entitle him to procedural protections
approaching those afforded by the contested case provisions
163. 440 P.2d 1, 3 (Wyo. 1968).
164. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-101(b) (i) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
165. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-101(b) (ii) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
166. "Notice; hearing.-When the grant, denial, suspension, or renewal of a
license is required by law to be preceded by notice and an opportunity for
hearing the provisions of this act (8 9-4-101 to 9-4-115] concerning contested cases apply." WYO. STAT. § 9-4-113(a) (1977).
167. WYO. STAT. § 12-4-104(a) and (b) (1977).
168. WYO. STAT. § 12-4-104(c) (1977).
169. Any adversely affected party-whether a licensee whose renewal is denied
or a resident aggrieved at its reissuance--will get the same sort of judicial
review: "on the record" pursuant to section 9-4-114 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-114 (1977).
170. Bear in mind, since a city council is not an "agency," no one can invoke
the APA. See supra note 114.
171. See supra note 148.
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of the APA. If the licensee, however, does not assert his
procedural rights, it is doubtful that anyone else can. Certainly the interests of people residing in the vicinity of the
licensed premises, although sufficient to give them standing, 17 would not rise to the level of "property" interests
entitling them to procedural due process. If the renewal
applicant, the one "entitled" to due process, obtains certain
procedural protections, then the same procedures should
apply to all parties to the hearing; but if he does not, then
no one else should be heard to complain.7 '
As to an application for an initial license before the
county commissioners, which was the situation in Walker,
it is correct that the availability of any judicial review
would seem dependent on the outcome.' 4 The contested case
procedures of the Wyoming APA, however, should apply at
the hearing regardless of the outcome (and the consequent
availability of judicial review). Even though the court was
correct some twenty-five years ago in Whitesides v. Council
of City of Cheyenne,' in refusing to find a property interest in an initial application, this does not end the matter
under the APA. The absence of a property right may well
preclude an initial licensing from being a "contested case" under the definition in section 9-4-101 (b) (ii),"1'

but this does

not prevent the contested case procedures of the APA from
applying. This is because section 9-4-113 (a) of the Admin172. See infra notes 184-190 and accompanying text.
173. Procedures on appeal would also seem to vary with the identity of the
appellee. If the denied renewal applicant appeals, he is entitled to the
sort of trial de novo described in Whirl Inn. If an adversely-affected
resident wishes judicial review, he can only attempt to utilize the general
jurisdiction given the district courts by article 5, section 10, of the Wyoming Constitution and file an original action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the city for, e.g., acting outside the scope of its statutory authority.
174. That is, pursuant to the express terms of section 12-4-104(e), a losing
applicant will be entitled to no judicial review of his denial. See supra note
157 and discussion of the denial of Walkers' application in the opinion, 644
P.2d at 774. A county resident aggrieved by the issuance of an initial
license, however, would be entitled to judicial review under the general
grant thereof in section 9-4-114(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
See this holding in the Walker opinion, 644 P.2d at 775, and the discussion
in United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d
749, 750-51 (Wyo. 1978).
175. 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 522-23 (1957).
176. Notice, however, that, on a literal reading, the definition of contested case
includes "privileges" as well as "rights" required by law to be determined
after a hearing. See WYo. STAT. § 9-4-101(b) (ii) (1977).
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istrative Procedure Act requires contested case procedures
to be followed whenever the "grant" or the "denial," as well
as the renewal, of a license is required to be preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing." As mentioned before,
section 12-4-104 of the Wyoming Statutes quite expressly
requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing to precede
the grant or denial of an initial license. The right to a contested case hearing, therefore, does not depend on the right
to appeal. This is as it should be. Otherwise, county commissioners would be in the position of not knowing whether
to afford contested case procedures until they knew which
way they were going to decide the application.' s Dicta in
the Walker opinion indicative of this absurd conclusion'
should be ignored. True, a person whose initial application
was denied without proper procedures being followed would
have no remedy; but this does not mean that he had no procedural right under the APA.
When an application for an initial liquor license is
filed with the city, the situation is obviously quite different. Without the application of the APA and without any
protection from procedural due process, the only procedures' 0 - required for anyone - the applicant or affected
neighbors - are those few specified in the liquor licensing
statutes' 8' and whatever procedures are adopted by the city
council itself. Again, an aggrieved applicant is statutorily
barred from appealing a denial, ' while a city resident
177. See supra note 157.
"Let the jury consider the verdict," the King said, for about the
178.
twentieth time that day.
"No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first-verdict afterwards."
"Stuff and nonsense!" said Alice loudly. "The idea of having
the sentence first!"
L. CARROLL, ALiCE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 187.
179. 644 P.2d at 775.
180. The applicant may, for what it's worth, have the minimal protection against
irrationality afforded by substantive due process and equal protection. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). This may have been what the Wyoming
Supreme Court had in mind in White8ides when it left open the possibility
of recourse to the courts to correct arbitrary and capricious exercise of

even initial licensing authority. See 319 P.2d at 525-26.

181. See supra note 149.
182. See 8upra note 174.
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adversely affected by the issuance of an initial license may
bring a lawsuit in district court. 8 3
In sum, therefore, the court's dicta in Walker concerning the procedural rights of applicants for renewal and initial issuance of liquor licenses was at best unhelpful - and
at worst wrong.
On the other hand, the court was correct in characterizing the precise issue on appeal as whether the Walkers
had standing to challenge the issuance of the license to the
Gustafsons by asserting the interests of "residents" of the
vicinity or the county in their "welfare" or their "desires."18 '
The court did not, however, decide this standing issue simply
by looking to the face of the Walkers' petition for review
and/or the position expressed in their brief on appeal. Instead the court seemed to look behind the Walkers' representation of their position and determine what it felt to be their
real interest:
In applying for a similar license very near the
place for which Gustafsons were granted a license,
the Walkers impliedly acknowledged that a license
at that location was not contrary to the desires of
the residents of the county and would not have an
adverse and serious effect Upon the welfare of the
people residing in the vicinity."'
Such a "waiver" approach, apparently based on the court's
view of the Walkers' "true" position before the county commissioners, is not entirely satisfying.'8 6
183.
184.
185.
186.

See supra note 173.
See supra note 159; 644 P.2d at 775.
644 P.2d at 777.
In a special concurrence, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rose,
voiced his disagreement with any suggestion by the majority that the
Walkers' standing was inhibited by their competing application for a license. They "would limit the scope of the review to those objections or
issues which were presented at the hearing." Walker v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 644 P.2d at 777 (Wyo. 1982) (Thomas, J., concurring).

So stated

this merely seems to correctly apply Rule 12.09 of the Wyoming Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Justice Thomas went on, however, to explain his concurrence by emphasizing that the Walkers themselves made no objection or
protest at the administrative level to the Gustafsons' application for a
liquor license; this he viewed as a "waiver" of all grounds for review. Id.
at 778. This may be an unreasonably strict requirement. Rule 12.09 is
worded in the passive voice, and it should be construed to allow appellate
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An unsuccessful applicant should not be able to avoid
a statutory bar to appeal of a denial of his application by
portraying it as an appeal of the successful applicant's license, following a consolidated hearing. On the other hand,
if - even in part - the losing applicant had also taken the
position of an adversely affected resident who would suffer
(apart from his loss of liquor business) from the issuance
of the license to his competitor, he should have standing to
assert his "welfare" and "desire" interests upon judicial
review."" Under the modern relaxed approach to standing
in administrative law, a petitioner need only allege injury
to one interest within the "zone of interests" protected by
the law which he is invoking in his behalf [here the criteria
for liquor licensing in section 12-4-104 (b)] in order to have
standing in court.""8
The court, however, obviously chose not to recognize the
"resident welfare" interest asserted by the Walkers. How it
knew that the Walkers' concern for the welfare of persons
residing in the vicinity of the Gustafsons' premises (including themselves?) was "purported" and that they did not
come into court with "clean hands" is not clear on the face
of the opinion."8 In any event, the court's holding was not
that an applicant could never have standing, as an affected
resident of the vicinity, to challenge the application of his
competitor - only that, in the circumstances of this case, it
did not attribute such a dual position to the Walkers.19 °
review to cover any issue raised before the agency by any participant in
an administrative proceeding (so long as the party seeking judicial review
asserts a colorable interest in the issue on appeal).
187. Judging solely from the portrayal of hearing testimony in Walkers' brief
on appeal to the supreme court, it appears that the Walkers did voice several complaints as residents of the vicinity of the Gustafsons' bar and night
club: e.g., in order to sleep in their home just across the highway from the
Gustafsons' premises, they were forced on occasion to leave their bedroom
and try to sleep in the living room. See Brief of Appellants, supra note
154, at 5, 6, 7, 25, 26. Such evidence in the record was apparently overcome
in the court's opinion by other evidence of the Walkers' "actual" position.
188. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

189. 644 P.2d at 776.
190.

Although § 12-4-104(e), oupra, denies the right of appeal to
an applicant for a new license only from a decision denying his
application, the status in which such applicant places himself by
the application will normally preclude him from standing to contest

the issuance to another of the license for which he applied. Certainly, the circumstances in this case makes such so.
14. (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/6

48

Battle: Administrative Law, Wyoming Style

1983

ADMINISTRATiVE LAW

271

CONCLUSION

Despite the loose language in Walker, the April, 1982,
term of the Wyoming Supreme Court, everything considered,
was a good one for administrative law. The decisions discussed in this article provide precedent for the predictability,
cohesiveness, and political neutrality so necessary for effective implementation of any branch of the law - but so often
lacking in the administrative area. If the lower courts and
lawyers in the state will adhere to the supreme court's
example; will take the time to familiarize themselves with
the basic principles of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, as fleshed out by these opinions; and will not distort the law to reach the desired result in a particular case
then all of us will benefit. Certainly the author and his
students will, for it is far easier to teach and learn decisions
of this overall quality.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

49

